Of Blimps and Appraisals and Judicial Grace by Hutton, William T.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
1993
Of Blimps and Appraisals and Judicial Grace
William T. Hutton
UC Hastings College of the Law, huttonw@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation





UC Hastings College of the Law Library 
 
Author: William T. Hutton  
Source: Back Forty 
Citation: 4 BACK FORTY 13 (Nov./Dec. 1993). 
Title: Of Blimps and Appraisals and Judicial Grace 
   
Originally published in BACK FORTY. This article is reprinted with permission from BACK FORTY and The 
Hyperion Society.
examination of the filed return and the taxpayer has 
"reasonably and in good faith" failed to make the 
election. Rev. Rul. 92-85. Once made, the election 
is irrevocable. LR.C. § 2032A(d)(I). 
In order to avoid problems with the filing dates, 
the estate may make a protective election by follow-
ing the procedures above. However, the election 
will require valuing the property at its fair market 
value. When" it is determined that the estate quali-
fies for special-use valuation, the executor must file 
an additional notice of election within 60 days of the 
determination. This does not extend the time for 
payment of any tax. Treas. Reg. § 2032A-8(b). 
While the timing issue can be seen as flexible (it 
allows various extensions), the question of "sub-
stantial compliance" with the regulations is one on 
which courts remain divided. Where the executor 
failed to attach a notice of election and recapture 
agreement to the estate tax return, the court disal-
lowed the special-use valuation. Foss v. U.S., 865 
F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1989). Similarly, the court disal-
lowed the special-use valuation where an executor 
attached the notice of election but failed to provide 
documentation to substantiate the special-use value 
as required by the regulations. Estate of Pauline 
Strickland v. C.I.R., 92 T.C. 16 (1989). 
The cases and regulations cited above show that, 
due to the detailed nature of Section 2032A and 
implementing regulations, courts are reluctant to al-
low executor~ any leeway in providing the necessary 
documentation (except for previously mentioned au-
tomatic filing extensions). Therefore, in order to 
qualify for a valid election, the executor must attach 
a recapture agreement and the notice of election, 
paying particular attention to the factors outlined by 
Treasury Regulation Section 20.2032A-8(a)(3) for 
inclusion in the notice of election. 
In summary, interpreting Section 2032A spe-
cial-use valuation elections require that the executor 
ask two questions. First, is this a qualified property 
fulfilling all of the criteria outlined in the Internal 
Revenue Code Section 2032A? Second, have I sub-
stantially complied with the recordkeeping require-
ments in the attached notice of election and recap-
ture agreement? If the answer to each of these 
questions is in the affirmative, the qualified property 
will be valued at its special-use value rather than its 
"highest and best use." 
Audra Mai is a second-year student at Hastings College 
of the Law and a staff member ofThe Back Forty. 
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From The Bench 
Of Blimps and Appraisals and 
Judicial Grace 
On December 12, 1986, DeWayne and Karen 
Bond, residents of Albuquerque, New Mexico, do-
nated two "thermal airships" (blimps) to the Maxie 
L. Anderson Foundation. In that same month, one 
Sid Cutter, who had spent his entire adult life in the 
aviation industry and amply satisfied the require-
ments of the Treasury regulations as to his "quali-
fied appraiser" credentials, determined the fair mar-
ket value of that contribution to be $60,000, based 
on salvage value. 
Prior to the due date for the filing of the Bonds' 
income tax return for 1986, Cutter completed por-
tions of the Appraisal Summary - part of IRS Form 
8283 - by describing the blimps, stating their ap-
praised fair market value, summarizing their overall 
physical condition, and by attesting that he neither 
had any financial interest in the transaction nor any 
relationship that would cause a reasonable person to 
question his independence. Cutter failed to recite 
his appraisal qualifications, however, and, most no-
tably, no separate written appraisal of the blimps, 
other than that reflected on Form 8283, was ever 
prepared. 
In the fullness of time, as you might have 
guessed, the IRS commenced the audit rumpus. The 
examining agent's deficiency notice asserted (among 
other claims of dereliction abandoned before trial) 
that the deduction could not be allowed because the 
taxpayers had failed to obtain and attach to their tax 
return a qualified appraisal, as required by Treasury 
regulation § 1.170A-13, promulgated pursuant to 
Congress' direction in the Deficit Reduction Act of 
1984. 
Let us pause here to observe that the foregoing 
rather truncated version of the salient facts might 
modestly be characterized as severely deficient tax 
planning, whatever the ultimate result. That the 
Bonds' unusual donation became the subject of a 
Tax Court autopsy is in itself a substantial financial 
(and perhaps emotional) setback, and the attorney 
who had the unenviable task of trying to salvage the 
salvage-based deduction without a written appraisal 
must have felt doubly cursed when she learned that 
Cutter had evidently misplaced his written computa-
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tions, schedules and notes on the Bonds' donation. 
(Efforts to find them proved unavailing.) 
Nonetheless, into the breach. The Commissioner 
contended that the taxpayers' footfaults in regard to 
the information required by Form 8283 were fatal. 
The Bonds responded that they had "substantially 
complied" with the requirements of the law, and 
were therefore entitled to the tax benefits claimed. 
The parties moved for summary judgment by stipu-
lating to all material facts, including the value of the 
blimps. Thus the case turned on whether the re-
quirements of the Treasury regulations as to report-
ing requirements are "mandatory" or "directory." If 
the former, procedural inattentiveness proves deadly. 
If the latter, then the Bonds' substantial compliance 
would carry the day. 
The Tax Court found that the taxpayers "met all 
the elements required to establish the substance or 
essence of a charitable contribution, but merely failed 
to attain and attach to their return a separate written 
appraisal containing the information specified in (the) 
regulations .... " Substantial compliance was suffi-
cient, and the "denial of a charitable deduction un-
der these circumstances would constitute a sanction 
which is not warranted or justified." 
Lest our vicarious delight in the Bonds' victory 
cause us to make more of this little story than it truly 
deserves, note that the blimps were donated in 1986, 
and the Tax Court decision was rendered in 1993. 
Justice is rarely delivered on the fast track. And the 
best tax case is no case at all. DeWayne Bond, 100 
T.C._ No.3 (1993). 
- William T. Hutton 
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Questions & Answers 
The questions below are based on actual problems 
faced by land trusts. Most originate from The Back 
Forty Research Service. Distinguishingfacts have been 
changed to preserve the anomymity of the organizations 
and individuals involved. 
The Back Forty welcomes your questions. Please 
send your questions to Questions & Answers, The Back 
Forty, Hastings College of the Law, 200 McAllister 
Street, San Francisco, California 94102. 
Q Our land trust does business in areas that are 
pretty remote, and while the problem about to be 
described is purely hypothetical, we think about it 
annually as the end of the calendar year approaches. 
Suppose we plan to have a landowner donate a 
conservation easement comfortably before year-end, 
but, for one reason or another, end up doing a last-
minute deal over the landowner's kitchen table. We 
have brought along a notary, so that the deed is 
signed, sealed and delivered, but there is no hope of 
getting to the county records office before closing 
time on December 31. Does the failure to record 
cause the deduction to be pushed into the following 
year? 
A No, the crucial deadline has been met - de-
livery of the deed. The land trust's protection against 
a subsequent transferee will not be secured, how-
ever, until recording occurs. It would behoove you, 
under these circumstances, to be first in line at the 
county office when next it opens for business. 
Q We are dealing with a partnership that ac-
quired about 80 acres of beachfront property some 
four years ago, with the intent to secure develop-
ment approvals and market the property. They have 
been frustrated at every turn, but despite their inabil-
ity to gain the entitlements they seek, the property 
has roughly tripled in value, owing to its uniqueness 
and the tremendous development pressure in the area. 
The partners now appear willing to consider a bar-
gain sale at a price equal to their original cost, pro-
vided that the appreciation in value may be consid-
ered a charitable contribution. How should they go 
about establishing their entitlement to a charitable 
deduction? 
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